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IS MORRISON DEAD? 

ASSESSING A SUPREME DRUG (LAW) OVERDOSE 

by 

Jonathan H. Adle/ 

Drugs would destroy the bravest and craziest ofthe rock stars. 
_ Stephen Davis I 
Dnlg prohibition does violence to the Constitution. 
- David Boaz2 
There was little doubt that the federal government would prevail in 
Gonzales v. Raich. What was, perhaps, so unexpected was so expansive a 
repudiation of enforceable judicial limitations on federal power. In 
upholding the constitutionality of the Controlled Substances Act as­
applied to the non-commercial intrastate possession and consumption of 
marijuana for medical purposes as authorized under California law, the 
Supreme Court hollowed out the core ofcontemporary Commerce Clause 
juri:,prudence. Insofar as United States v. Morrison had stood for the 
prapositions that only intrastate economic activities could be aggregated 
for purposes of the "substantial affects" test, that attenuated connections 
between a regulatory scheme and interstate commerce exceeded 
Congress's limited and enumerated powers, and, perhaps most 
importantly, that judicial review should serve as the ultimate check on 
overly broad assertions offederal power, it may now be a dead letter. 
The rationale adopted by Justice Stevens's majority opinion undercuts 
the primary judicial safeguards offederalism. While the Raich majority 
purports to be {ollowing the doctrinal contours ofLopez and Morrison, it 
actually represents a repudiation of these prior cases. Further, Raich 
continued the Supreme Court's uninterrupted practice of rejecting as­
applied challenges to federal statutes, and is likely to preclude any such 
suits in thefuture. The inability to mount as-applied challenges to broad 
regulatory statutes like the CSA is significant because it creates 
additional barriers to fillure Commerce Clause litigation. The lack of a 
viable way to challenge discrete applications of broader federal laws 
means few Commerce Clause challenges can ever hope to succeed. The 
• Visiting Associate Professor of Law, George Mason University School of Law; Associate 
Professor and Associate Director, Center for Business Law & Regulation, Case Western 
Reserve University School of Law. The author would like to thank Nelson Lund, Andrew 
Morriss, Christina Rorick, and Nathaniel Stewart for the comments on earlier drafts of this 
Article. Any errors, omissions, irrelevancies, or inanities are solely the fault of the author. 
I STEPHEN DAVIS, 11M MORRISON: LIFE, DEATH, LEGEND xii (Gotham Books 2004). 
2 David Boaz, Drug Prohibition Has Failed, Cato Institute, Mar. 3, 1997, available at 
http: //www.cato.org/dailys/3-03-97.html . 
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central holding ofMorrison, like the legendary Jim Morrison, nnw lives 
on only in the hearts oftrue believers. 
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All eyes were on Jim Morrison when The Doors took the stage. Audiences 
never knew quite what to expect, but there was never much doubt that it would 
be a night to remember. He could leave an entire concert hall in spellbound 
awe, or storm off in a substance-induced rage. One night he could be the 
world's most impressive and influential rock musician- sought out by Mick 
Jagger for advice on how to perform on stage.3 Another he could be a virtual 
sociopath, assaulting audiences with invective, spurring riots, and getting 
himself arrested for allegedly obscene conduct.4 Audiences could not know in 
advance whether they would see the rock legend who inspired millions, or the 
twenty-something has-been who would later die of a drug overdose. Yet at 
every Doors show, one thing was for certain: It would not be forgotten. s 
During the Supreme Court's October 2004 term, all eyes were on 
Gonzales v. Raich.6 While there was never much doubt about the outcome­
few expected Angel Raich and the other respondents to prevail- legal 
commentators did not know quite what to expect. The Chief Justice could pen a 
narrow opinion for the Court, rejecting Raich' s claim by distinguishing the 
regulation of commodities from other expansive exercises of federal power, 
thereby preserving the essential holdings of United States v. Lopez7 and (more 
importantly) United States v. Morrison. 8 The Chief had safeguarded federalism 
before, he could do it again.9 Or Justice Stevens, the ranking dissenter from the 
) See DAVIS, supra note I, at 263~64. 
4 Most infamously, Miami police filed a warrant for Morrison's arrest after a March 
1969 show at which he allegedly exposed his genitals to the audience. J:yewitnesses deny the 
police account, but it generated notations in Morrison's FBI file nonetheless. See DAVIS, 
supra note I, at 319~21 , 322~23. One Morrison biographer would describe the subsequent 
trial as a politically motivated "kangaroo court." Id. at 383. This was not Morrison' s only 
brush with the law. At another show in New Haven, Morrison was arrested for obscenity 
after launching into a tirade about how he had been maced by a police officer before the 
show while he was "getting acquainted" with a local college student. /d. at 214-16. 
5 Indeed, it is a testament to the memorability of Morrison's performances that a recent 
biography was able to detail well over one-hundred performances by The Doors in the 
band's very short musical career. See generally D AV IS , supra note 1. 
6 125 S. Ct. 2 I 95 (2005). 
514 U.S. 549 (1995). 
8 529 U.S. 598 (2000). 
9 See Reno v. Condon, 528 U.S. 118 (2000) (upholding the Driver's Privacy Prolection 
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Rehnquist Court's "New Federalism" could collect five votes to free federal 
power from judicial restraints. In recent terms, the "federalist five" had shown 
itself to be a less stable court majority than some had hoped or feared. 1o One 
thing was certain, Raich would be an important federalism case. 
That the federal government would prevail did not necessari Iy mean that a 
pillar of the "New Federalism" would suffer a mortal blow in the process. Yet 
that appears to be the outcome in Raich. In upholding the constitutionality of 
the Controlled Substances Act as-applied to the non-commercial intrastate 
possession and consumption of marijuana for medical purposes as authorized 
under California law, the Supreme Court hollowed out the core of 
contemporary Commerce Clause jurisprudence. Insofar as Morrison stood for 
the propositions that only intrastate economic activities could be aggregated for 
purposes of the "substantial affects" test, that attenuated connections between a 
regulatory scheme and interstate commerce exceeded Congress's limited and 
enumerated powers, and, perhaps most importantly, that judicial review should 
serve as the ultimate check on overly broad assertions of federal power, it is no 
more. For this-killing Morrison- it is unlikely Raich will be forgotten. 
Part I of this Article opens with the soft parade of United States v. Lopez, a 
tentative and meager start to the reinvigoration of enumerated powers. While 
Lopez is seen as the foundational modern Commerce Clause case, Part II 
suggests it was United States v. Morrison that represented the rea) breakthrough 
for the "New Federalism." Far more than Lopez, Morrison suggested that the 
judicial safeguards of federalism II were real and would be enforced, even in the 
context of enumerated powers. 12 It highlighted the distinction of economic and 
non-economic activity for Commerce Clause analysis and stressed the need for 
some judicially enforceable limit on federal power. 
Part III turns to the Raich decision, delineating how the rationale adopted 
by Justice Stevens's majority opinion undercuts the primary judicial safeguards 
of federalism solidified by Morrison . While the Raich majority purports to be 
following the doctrinal contours of Lopez and Morrison, it actually represents a 
repudiation of these prior cases. Part III also considers some of the other 
opinions that were (and were not) written to justify the Court's result. Justice 
Scalia's opinion concurring in the judgment is no less expansive than Justice 
Stevens's majority, and is equally lethal to Morrison's central holding. Justice 
Kennedy, on the other hand, concurred with the majority opinion without 
Act as a proper exercise of Congress's Commerce Clause power). 
10 Recent federalism cases in which the five most conservative justices failed to vote 
together include: Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S . 509 (2004) (upholding abrogation of state 
sovereign immunity under Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act); Alaska Dep't of 
Envtl. Cons. v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 540 U.S. 461 (2004) (upholding federal preemption of 
state permitting decision); Nev. Dep't of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721 (2003) 
(upholding abrogation of sovereign immunity under the Family and Medical Leave Act). 
II See generally John C. Y00, The Judicial Safeguards of Federalism, 70 S. CAL. L 
REv. 1311 (1997) (arguing that "judicial safeguards" of federalism replaced "political 
safeguards" in the Rehnquist Court). 
12 Cf ROBERT F. NAGEL, THE IMPLOSION OF AMERICAN FEDERALISM 17 (2001) ("the 
idea of limited national power is not judicially enforceable"). 
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explanation. Given his outspoken defenses of federalism in the past, this silence 
is quite conspicuous, as it appears he has changed his views on the judicial 
safeguards of federalism. 
Part IV discusses the particular difficulties posed by as-applied Commerce 
Clause challenges. Both Lopez and Morrison had been facial challenges to 
federal statutes. No as-applied Commerce Clause challenge has prevailed in the 
Supreme Court since the New Deal. Raich continued the Supreme Court's 
uninterrupted practice of rejecting such challenges to federal statutes, and is 
likely to preclude any such suits in the future . The inability to mount as-applied 
challenges to broad regulatory statutes like the Controlled Substances Act is 
significant because it creates additional barriers to future Commerce Clause 
litigation. All but the most aggressive believers in a "New Federalist" 
jurisprudence would hesitate before nullifying wide swaths of the federal code. 
The lack of a viable way to challenge discrete applications of broader federal 
laws means few Commerce Clause challenges can ever hope to succeed. The 
Article concludes by considering whether Morrison ' s central holding, like Jim 
Morrison himself, lives on only in the hearts of true believers. For those who 
believe in Morrison's message, the outlook is grim. 
I. THE SOFT PARADE l3 
The Supreme Court's decision invalidating the Gun-Free School Zone Act 
(GFSZA) in United States v. Lopez l4 was quite unexpected. The Court had not 
struck down a federal statute for exceeding the scope of the Commerce Clause 
in over one-half century. After the New Deal revolution, the idea that there 
were justiciable limits on the scope of Congress's Commerce Clause power 
was a dead letter. 15 As then-Justice William Rehnquist observed in 1981 , "one 
could easily get the sense from this Court' s opinions that the federal system 
exists only at the sufferance of Congress.,,16 Indeed, the reigning legal doctrine 
relied upon "political safeguards," rather than judicial review, to ;rotect state 
autonomy and enforce constitutional limitations on federal power. I 
13 THE DOORS, The Soft Parade, on THE SOFT PARADE (ElektraJAsylum Records 1969). 
14 514 U.S. 549 (1995). 
15 See, e.g. , BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE-VOL. I: FOUNDATIONS 105 (1991) 
(noting that after the New Deal "[a] commitment to federalism . . . was no longer thought to 
require a constitutional strategy that restrained the national government to a limited number 
of enumerated powers over economic and social life"). 
16 Hodel v. Va . Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 308 (1981) 
(Rehnquist, 1. , concurring). For the same reason, Ninth Circuit Judge Alex Kozinski 
characterized the Commerce Clause as the "Hey, you-can-do-whatever-you-feel-like 
Clause." Alex Kozinski , Introduction to Volume Nineteen, 19 HARv. lL. & PUB. POL'y 1, 5 
(1995). 
17 See, e.g., Garcia v. Sail Antonio Metropolitan Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985). 
The political safeguards theol)' upon which Garcia relied is outlined in Herbert Wechsler, 
The Political Safeguards ofFederalism: The Role ofStates in the Composition and Selection 
of the National Government, 54 COLUM. L. REv. 543 (1954). See also JESSE H. CHOPER, 
JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS (1980); Jesse H. Choper, The 
Scope of National Power Vis-a-vis the States: The Dispensability of Judicial Review, 86 
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The revival of judicially enforceable limits on federal power prompted 
strong reaction as commentators greeted, or condenmed, the Court for a 
potentially radical shift in federalism jurisprudence. Professor Laurence Tribe 
commented that Lopez, in conjunction with other federalism decisions, brought 
the Court "close" to "somethin~ radically different from the modem 
understanding of the Constitution." The New York Times' Linda Greenhouse 
warned Lopez "put in play . .. fundamental questions about the essential nature 
of the Federal Government,,19 
Despite the strong reaction, Lopez was a particularly modest opinion. 2o 
While starting at "first principles" with an assertion of limited and enumerated 
powers, Chief Justice RehnRuist's majority opinion was quite tentative and 
embraced a narrow holding.2 The Court eschewed any "precise formulation" 
that would create a bright-line limitation on federal power. 22 The Court instead 
stressed that there had to be some limit on federal power, but never made clear 
what that limit entailed.23 It rejected the federal government 's arguments for 
sustaining the GFSZA because such arguments would create a commerce 
power without limit-in effect a federal police power-but it did not identifY 
how limited the commerce power should be. 
Under Lopez, the Constitution grants Congress the power to regulate in 
three areas: 1) the use of the channels of interstate commerce; 2) the 
instrumentalities of interstate commerce, or persons or things in interstate 
commerce; and 3) those activities that "substantially affect" interstate 
commerce?4 The first two categories are rather unambiguous. If an item is used 
or sold in interstate commerce, it may be regulated, as may the channels 
through which such items flow. The contours of the "substantial effects" test, 
on the other hand, are less obvious-and subject to the greatest dispute. 
As described in Lopez-and subsequently elaborated upon in Morrison­
the "substantial effects" test is more qualitative than quantitative. It is more 
YALE L.J. 1552 (1977). While Garcia was not a Commerce Clause case, the political 
safeguards theory it articulated has been advanced in the Commerce Clause context. 
18 Quoted in Linda Greenhouse, Focus on Federal Power, N.Y. TIMES, May 24, 1995, 
at AI. 
19 Linda Greenhouse, Focus on Federal Power, N.Y. TIMES, May 24, 1995, at AI . 
20 In particular, Lopez stopped far short of an originalist conception of the Commerce 
Clause. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 584 (Thomas, J., concurring). See also 
Randy E. Barnett, New Evidence of the Meaning of the Commerce Clause, 55 ARK. L. REv. 
847 (2003); Randy E. Barnett, The Original Meaning ofthe Commerce Clause, 68 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 101 (200 I); Richard A. Epstein, The Proper Scope of the Commerce Power, 73 VA. L. 
REv. 1387 (1987) . 
21 Lopez, 514 U.S. at 552, "After its ringing opening, the majority opinion quickly 
retreats from a robust, principled theory of enumerated powers." MICHAEL S. GREVE, REAL 
FEDERALISM: WHY IT MATTERS, How IT COULD HAPPEN 27 (1999). 
22 Lopez, 514 U.S. at 567 ("These are not precise formulations ..."). 
23 GREVE, supra note 21, at 28 ("The observation that there has to be some limit to 
congressional power and some distinction between commercial and noncommercial 
activities leads back to the questions of where that limit and distinction might be found, and 
Lopez provides no clear answer."). 
24 Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558- 59. 
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concerned with the nature of the regulated activity or the regulatory scheme in 
question than with the aggregate economic impact of the regulated activity 
alone, or in combination with other similarly regulated activities. Summarizing 
prior precedent, the Court detected a "clear" pattern: "Where economic activity 
substantially affects interstate commerce, legislation regulating that activity 
will be sustained.,,25 The activity regulated by the GFSZA- possessing a gun in 
a school zone-"by its terms ha[d] nothing to do with 'commerce' or any sort 
of economic enterprise, however broadly one might define those terms.,,26 
Therefore, it did not "substantially affect" commerce, even if aggregated with 
all other instances of like conduct. As the majority observed, under such 
reasoning "Congress could regulate not only all violent crime, but all activities 
that might lead to violent crime, regardless of how tenuously they relate to 
interstate commerce.',27 If the only question is whether a particular class of 
activities impacts interstate economic activity in some identifiable way, there is 
hardly anything that falls outside of Congress's authority. And that is the whole 
point of the Lopez test-to reassert the existence of some limit on federal 
power, even if the limit itself remained undefined. 
The initial doctrinal import of Lopez was further softened by Justice 
Kennedy's concurring opinion, joined by Justice O'Connor, that "counsel[ed] 
great restraint" before enforcing Commerce Clause limits.28 The concurrence 
strongly indicated that the two swing justices were not entirely on board with 
the majority's reinvigoration of the judicial safeguards of federalism, even in a 
modest formulation . The Lopez holding was "necessary though limited,,29 and 
the interest of preserving a federal-state balance would have to be weighed 
against the nation's "immense stake in the stability of [the Court's] Commerce 
Clause jurisprudence as it has evolved to this point.,,3o While the Court would 
intervene where Congress clearly overstepped its bounds, Justice Kennedy 
emphasized that the ultimate check on federal power had to come from the 
political branches themselves.3l 
The majority placed greatest emphasis on the Commerce Clause itself, and 
whether a regulated activity could be said to "substantially affect" interstate 
commerce. Justice Kennedy, on the other hand, stressed the need to safeguard 
"areas of traditional state concern." In this formulation, judicial review is more 
appropriate to prevent federal intrusion into territory historically the province 
of the states than it is to enforce any textual limit on the federal government's 
25 ld. at 560. 

26 !d. 

27 Ed. at 564. 

2 8 ld. at 568 (Kennedy, J. , concurring). 

29 ld. 

30 ld. at 574. 
31 ld. at 577. Thus, while Kennedy rejected a "complete renunciation of the judicial 
role" (emphasis added) he also stressed : "[I.]t would be mistaken and mischievous for the 
political branches to forget that the sworn obligation to preserve and protect the Constitution 
in maintaining the federal balance is their own in the first and primary instance." Ed. at 578, 
577. 
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enumerated POWe:fS. As Justice Kennedy warned, "Were the Federal 
Government to take over the regulation of entire areas of traditional state 
concern, areas having nothing to do with the regulation of commercial 
activities , the boundaries between the spheres of federal and state authority 
would blur and political responsibility would become illusory.,,32 As he 
presented it, this distinction between "state" and "federal" was not particularly 
coherent. Without reference to the textual division of governmental power, or 
some exogenous theory of subsidiarity within a federal republic, there is no 
clear basis for assuming a given matter is more a state or federal concern, and 
Justice Kennedy never provided such a theory. 
One reason in particular to safeguard state policy prerogatives is to ensure 
that states may operate as laboratories of democracy trying "novel social and 
economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country."n It also enables 
34
states to develop policies that match local needs, preferences, and advantages.
Justice Kennedy noted it was "well established that education is a traditional 
concern of the States," and over forty states already outlawed gun possession in 
35
school to some degree. Insofar as gun possession in school zones was a 
problem, states were on the case, and undue federal intervention could only 
serve to impede the process by cutting states off from the costs and benefits of 
their own policy decisions. The GFSZA "foreclose[d] the States from 
experimenting and exercising their own judgment in an area to which States lay 
claim by right of history and expertise, and it does so by regulating an activity 
beyond the realm of commerce in the ordinary and usual sense of that term.,,36 
While Kennedy's opinion stressed the need for state experimentation, there 
does not seem to be much risk of state experimentation in the Lopez context 
because states are unlikely to compete by doing less to control crime--in other 
words, in the criminal law context, allowing for state experimentation is 
unlikely to produce much actual interjurisdictional competition of the sort that 
might justify intervention.37 For this rationale to have teeth, it would have to 
apply where state policy diversity would be less certain to yield uniformly 
"positive" results. 38 Laboratories are not free to experiment if they are not free 
to fail. 
If Lopez marked the start of an enumerated powers parade, it was a soft 
parade. Without challenging the vitality of prior precedent, the Court merely 
32 ld. at 577 (Kennedy, 1., concurring). 
33 See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J. , 
dissenting) ("It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous 
State may, If its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic 
experiments without risk to the rest of the country. "). 
34 See generally Michael W. McConnell, Federalism: Evaluating the Founders ' 
Design, 54 U. CHI. L. REv. 1484 (J 987). 
35 Lopez, 514 U.S. at 580- 81 (Kennedy, 1., concurring). 
36 ld. at 583 . 
37 See Richard A. Epstein, Constitutional Faith and the Commerce Clause, 71 NOTRE 
DAMEL. REv. 167,180 (1996). 
38 GREVE, supra note 21, at 82. 
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"decline[d] here to proceed any further.,,39 That a given activity sufficiently 
affected commerce to be subject to federal regulation would no longer be 
accepted solely on Congress's say so. The Court would make its own 
independent, if still deferential, assessment. Rehnquist's majority opinion 
sought to integrate Lopez into the Court's prior precedents, noting that prior 
opinions repeatedly acknowledged that the commerce power was limited in 
scope and stressing that even the most expansive of the prior precedents 
remained good law. It failed to challenge any of the existing post-New Deal 
precedents, preferring instead to reconcile them by distinguishing, and perhaps 
somewhat redefining them. As Michael Greve observed, Lopez did not 
"revive[] the enumerated powers doctrine of the pre-New Deal era in full 
regalia.,,4o Like the other initial federalism decisions, it merely sought to "make 
room for federalism concerns, without at the same time triggering a second 
constitutional war over enumerated powers." 41 In Chief Justice Rehnquist' s 
hands, even the most expansive post-New Deal cases acknowiedged some 
"outer limit" to federal regulatory power, even if it left unclear what that "outer 
limit" was. The strength of this opinion was further weakened by a concurring 
opinion focused on the need to preserve stability within federalism 
jurisprudence and acknowledge the realities of twentieth-century commerce. 
Lower courts clearly got the message. While academics and legal 
commentators saw a potential revolution in the Court's renewed willingness to 
police the scope of the federal government's enumerated powers, federal courts 
proved themselves completely uninterested in striking down additional federal 
42laws. Concerns about the scope of Commerce Clause authority prompted 
some courts to narrow the scope of federal statutes containing jurisdictional 
elements, but that was it.43 Other than the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth 
Circuit,44 no appellate court struck down a federal statute on Conunerce Clause 
grounds between 1995 and 2000.45 Moreover, at the same time the Court was 
re-establishing modest limits on federal power, other decisions, such as u.s. 
Term Limits v. Thornton,46 were "profoundly nationalistic. ,,47 If the Commerce 
19 Lopez, 514 U.S. at 567. 

40 GREVE, supra note 21, at 25. 

41 !d. 

42 See Glenn Reynolds & Brannon Denning, Lower Court Readings a/Lopez, or What 

if the Supreme Court Held a Constitutional Revolution and Nobody Came?, 2000 WIse. L. 
RFv. 369 (2000); see also Brannon Denning & Glenn Reynolds, Rulings and Resistance: 
The New Commerce Clause Jurisprudence Encounters the Lower Courts, 55 ARK. L. REv. 
1253 (2003). 
43 See, e.g., United States v. Perrotta, 313 F.3d 33 (2d Cir. 2002); United States v. Carr, 
271 F.3d 172 (4th Cir. 2001); United States v. Johnson, 246 F.3d 749 (5th Cir. 2001); United 
States v. Rea, 300 F.3d 952 (8th Cir. 2002); United States v. Lamont, 330 F.3d 1249 (9th 
Cir. 2003); United States v. Ballinger, 312 F.3d 1264 (lIth Cir. 2002). 
44 See Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic lnst., 169 F.3d 820, 839 (4th Cir. 1999) (en 
banc) afJ'd sub nom United States v. Morrison, 52~ U.S . 598 (2000). 
45 See Reynolds & Denning, supra note 42, at 369. 
46 514 U.S. 779 (1995). 
47 NAGEL, supra note 12, at 28 (2001). 
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Clause parade was to continue, the Court would have to take another significant 
step forward. 
II. BREAK ON THROUGH (TO THE OTHER SlDE)48 
While modest in scope, Lopez at least raised the possibility that federal 
courts would actively police the boundaries of federal power and stem the 
centralization of governmental authority.49 To do so, however, would require 
more than a single, tentative decision. The Supreme Court would need to 
5o
extend the doctrine in order to entrench it. The "warning shot" would have to 
be followed by a "full-out broadside.,,51 Five years after Lopez, the same five 
Justice majority appeared to take this step by striking down provisions of the 
Violence Against Women Act (VAWA) in United States v. Morrison. 52 
While most associate the reinvigoration of Commerce Clause scrutiny with 
Lopez, Morrisun was the real breakthrough for enumerated powers 
jurisprudence. This opinion expressed Commerce Clause doctrine in more 
resolute- if not completely unqualified-terms, suggesting the Court ' s 
majority was serious about the Commerce Clause. Morrison invalidated 
provisions of federal law Congress sought to enact explicitly pursuant to the 
Commerce Clause power. Unlike in Lopez, there was little sign any justice in 
the majority had any hesitation about striking down VA W A's provision 
providin?: a civil remedy in federal court for a "crime of violence motivated by 
gender." 3 There was no concurrence threatening to narrow the decision's 
54
reach.
Doctrinally, Morrison began where Lopez left off. Building on the prior 
decision's framework, the Morrison majority identified four factors for courts 
to consider in determining whether a given activity "substantially affects" 
interstate commerce. First and foremost, is the economic or commercial nature 
of the activity in question. Without adopting an ironclad rule, the Court noted 
that it had "upheld Commerce Clause regulation of intrastate activity only 
where that activity is economic in nature.,,55 Second is whether Congress 
included a jurisdictional element in the challenged statute that can serve to 
48 THE DOORS, Break on Through (to the Other Side), on THE DOORS (Elektra/Asylum 
Records 1967). 
49 See, e.g., Kathleen F. Brickey, Crime Control and the Commerce Clause: Life Ajier 
Lopez, 46 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 801 (1996). 
50 GREVE, supra note 21, at 45 ("Every application of Lopez . .. will almost surely 
extend it."). 
51 Adrian Vermeule, Does Commerce Clause Review Have Perverse Effects? 46 VILL. 
L. REv. 1325, 1327 (2001) ("the warning shot across Congress' bow in Lopez has been 
followed by the full-out broadside of United States v. Morrison"). 
52 529 U.S. 598 (2000). 
53 42 U.S.c. § 13981(d)(I) (2000). 
54 Justice Thomas authored a concurring opinion in Morrison, but as in Lopez, his 
opinion suggested the Court was too timid insofar as it relied upon the "substantial effects" 
test at all. See Morrison , 529 U.S. at 627 (Thomas, 1., concurring). 
55 Id. at 613. 
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"limit its reach to a discrete set" of actIvItIes that substantially affect 
commerce. 
56 Such a jurisdictional element does not ensure a statute's 
constitutionality,57 but it can provide courts with a basis upon which to construe 
a statute so as to keep it within constitutional limits.58 Third is whether 
Congress adopted legislative findings regarding the regulated activity's alleged 
substantial effect on interstate commerce. 59 As with a jurisdictional element, 
the adoption of legislative findings does not ensure a statute's 
constitutionality,60 but the adoption of such findings can assist a court in 
identifying a given activity's effect on interstate commerce, particularly if the 
effect is not obvious.61 The fourth and final factor is the nexus between the 
regulated activity and the alleged substantial effect on interstate commerce. Of 
particular concern to the Court here is that to accept highly attenuated 
connections of this type between intrastate activities and interstate commerce as 
the basis for Commerce Clause jurisdiction would make the courts "hard 
pressed to posit any activity by an individual that Congress is without power to 
regulate.,,6 If establishing an effect on commerce required piling inference 
upon inference--establishing a causal chain that could connect nearly any 
conceivable activity to commerce--the statute would not pass muster.63 
While the Court addressed all four factors, it did not stress them equally. 
Most of the work in Morrison was performed by the first and fourth factors­
whether the regulated activity was itself economic and whether the 
hypothesized link between the regulated activity and commerce was so 
attenuated as to provide a rationale for regulating anything at all. These two 
factors provided the opinion's core, and would ensure that federal power 
remained limited. The Court again avoided adopting a categorical rule against 
regulating noncommercial intrastate activity. Yet it reiterated that such a 
regulation had never been upheld.64 It further stressed that "the noneconomic, 
56 Id. at 612; United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549,562 (I995). 
57 See Morrison , 529 U.S. at 612 (noting jurisdictional element "may" establish the 
constitutionality of a given statute under the Commerce Clause). 
58 Jones v. United States, 529 U.S. 848, 857 (2000) ("[W]here a statute is susceptible of 
two constructions, by one of which grave and doubtful constitutional questions arise and by 
tbe other of which such questions are avoided" a court's "duty is to adopt the latter."). 
59 Morrison, 529 U.S. at 612. 
60 Lopez, 514 U.S. at 557 n.2 ("[S]impJy because Congress may conclude that a 
particular activity substantially affects interstate commerce does not necessarily make it 
so."). 
61 See id. at 563. 
62 ld. at 564; Mnrrison, 529 U.S . at 613. See also Michell N. Berman, Guillen and 
Gullibility: Piercing the SUiface ofCommerce Clause Doctrine, 89 IOWA L. R EV. 1487, 1528 
(2004) ("If the Relmquist Court's developing Commerce Clause doctrine is driven by a 
single impulse, it is the insistence that the doctrine not amount to a blank check."). 
63 See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 567. 
64 Morrison, 529 U.S. at 611 ("in those cases where we have sustained federal 
regulation of intrastate activity based upon the activity'S substantial effects on interstate 
commerce, the activity in question has been some sort of economic endeavor"); id. at 613 
("Whi le we need not adopt a categorical rule against aggregating the effects of any 
noneconomic activity .. . thus far in our Nation 's history our cases have upheld Commerce 
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criminal nature uf the conduct at issue" in Lopez was "central" to the 
decision.65 
As reified in Morrison, the "substantial effects" test is more qualitative 
than quantitative. It is more concerned with the nature of the regulated activity 
or the regulatory scheme in question than with the aggregate economic impact 
of the regulated activity alone, or in combination with other similarly regulated 
activities. The key question is whether the activity subject to federal regulation 
is itself related to "'commerce' or any sort of economic enterprise" or whether 
the regulation is "an essential part of a larger regulation of economic activity, in 
which the regulatory scheme could be undercut unless the intrastate activity 
were regulated. ,,66 Congress clearly has the authority to regulate activities that 
are "economic in nature,,,67 such as industrial mining68 or loan-sharking.69 It 
also may reach relatively minor intrastate activities that are themselves 
economic, or related to commercial conduct, through broad economic 
regulato~ schemes, such as a price maintenance regime for agricultural 
products. 0 But the fact that a given intrastate activity, when aggregated with al\ 
other instances of like conduct, may have a measurable impact on the nation's 
GDP is insufficient. The Court explicitly rejected "the argument that Congress 
may regulate noneconomic, violent criminal conduct based solely on that 
conduct's aggregate effect on interstate commerce.,,71 To hold otherwise would 
eviscerate judicial review of congressional exercises of the commerce power 
and make "the limitation of congressional authority ... solely a matter of 
legislative grace.,,72 
If nothing else, Morrison stood for the proposition that the federal 
commerce power would be constrained by judicial review. Morrison 
demonstrated---or so it appeared-that the Court' s new Commerce Clause 
jurisprudence was more than a one-hit wonder. The Court, or at least a slim 
majority of the justices, had shown its seriousness at policing federal intrusions 
into local concerns. Assuming the lower courts were listening,73 the nation 
Clause regulation of intrastate activity only where that activity is economic in nature."). 
65 Id. at 610. 
66 Lopez, 514 U.S . at 561. 
67 See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 608. 
68 See Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264 (1981). 
69 See Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146 (1971). 
70 See Wickard v. Filbum, 317 U.S. 111 (1942) (upholding application of agricultural 
production quotas to production for a farmer's own use because allowing such production 
would undermine the national price control scheme created by the Agricultural Adjustment 
Act of 1938); Lopez, 514 U.S. at 556 ("Even if appellee's activity be local and though it may 
not be regarded as commerce, it may still, whatever its nature, be reached by Congress if it 
exerts a substantial economic effect on interstate commerce, and this irrespective of whether 
such effect is what might at some earlier time have been defined as 'direct' or 'indirect. '" 
(citing Wickard, 31 7 U.S. at 125». 
71 Morrison , 529 U.S. at 617. 

72 Id. at 616. 

73 This assumption was not entirely warranted. See Brannon P. Denning & Glenn H. 

Reynolds, Rulings and Resistance: The New Commerce Clause Jurisprudence Encounters 
the Lower Courts, :i5 ARK. L. REv. 1253 (2003). 
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would rely upon the judicial safeguards of federalism, rather than the political 
safeguards of prior decisions. While federal courts, as a whole, were still 
reluctant to invalidate federal statutes on Commerce Clause grounds, some 
began to look favorably on as-applied Commerce Clause challenges. The U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, for instance, upheld Commerce Clause 
challenges to federal statutes where it found the litigants' conduct was not itself 
substantially related to interstate commerce?4 The laws in question were not 
invalidated, as occurred in Lopez and Morrison . Rather, in each case the court 
held the relevant laws unconstitutional as-applied to particular individuals. 
Among the successful litigants were Angel McClary Raich and Diane Monson, 
whose successful challenge to the Controlled Substances Act (CSA) would 
force the Supreme Court to confront the limits of the Commerce Clause once 
. 75 
agam. 
III. LIGHT MY FlRE76 
Angel Raich and her fellow respondents did not challenge the 
constitutionality of the Controlled Substances Act on its face-and with good 
reason. There is little basis for challenging the constitutionality of federal 
regulation of interstate markets in regulated drugs. Rather, they pressed an as· 
applied challenge to the application of the CSA to the "intrastate manufacture 
and possession of marijuana for medical purposes pursuant to California law 
exceeds Congress' authority under the Commerce Clause.,,77 While this sort of 
challenge did not frontally challenge the constitutionality of the Controlled 
Substances Act, it presented doctrinal problems of its own. 
Raich, like even the most expansive Commerce Clause opinions of the 
New Deal era, purported to recognize the continued limits on federal power. 
Yet, as with the New Deal opinions, this qualification is overwhelmed by the 
force of the doctrinal arguments deployed to uphold the challenged statute. 
While recognizing that the most expansive uses of the commerce power should 
be confined to economic activities, the majority so expanded the definition of 
"economic" so as to leave this a meaningless qualification. While reiterating 
the existence of Commerce Clause limits, the majority outlined a commerce 
power that is only limited by Congress's appetite for expansive legislation. In 
this way the Court, once again, displaced judicial review in favor of the 
political safeguards of federalism. Justice Scalia's concurrence, while providing 
a more nuanced-and perhaps a more doctrinally satisfying--rationale, was no 
74 See Raich v. Ashcroft, 352 F.3d 1222 (9th Cir. 2003) (upholding as-applied 
Commerce Clause challenge to application of federal Controlled Substances Act to medical 
marijuana) ; Stewart v. United States, 348 F.3d 1132 (9th Cir. 2003) (upholding Commerce 
Clause challenge to federal prohibition of possession of fully-automatic weapons as-applied 
to home-made firearm); United States v. McCoy, 323 F.3d 1114 (9th Cir. 2003) (upholding 
Commerce Clause challenge to federal prohibition on possession of child pornography as­
applied to family photo). 
75 Raich v. Ashcroft, 352 F.3d 1222 (9th Cir. 2003). 
76 THE DOORS, Light My Fire, on THE DOORS (ElektraiAsylum Records 1967). 
77 Gonzales v. Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195,2204-2205 (2005). 
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less expansive in its impact. Both the majority and concurring opinions 
ho!lowed out Morrison's core-leaving it without any substance, if any life at 
all. 
On the surface, Justice Stevens's majority opinion may seem consonant 
with the principles outlined in Morrison. As an initial matter, the opinion 
reiterates that Congress may regulate "purely local activities that are part of an 
economic 'class of activities' that have a substantial effect on interstate 
commerce. ,,78 If the regulated class is "economic," and "it exerts a substantial 
effect on interstate commerce," local or seemingly noncommercial activities 
within the class remain within federal reach.79 Yet the Court never really 
explains how the activity in question here is "economic" in any meaningful 
sense of the word. To the contrary, the Court searches out a relatively elastic 
definition of economic, and then stretches it beyond its own discovered 
definition. 
According to the one dictionary cited by the court, the 1966 Webster's 
Third New International Dictionary, "'Economics'" refers to '''the production, 
distribution, and consumption of commodities. ,,,80 Upon this basis, the Court 
declares that the activities at issue in Raich, "[u]nlike those at issue in Lopez 
and Morrison," are "quintessentially economic,,81 because those activities 
regulated by the CSA are the "production, distribution, and consumption of 
commodities for which there is an established, and lucrative, interstate 
market.,,82 Yet the activity to be regulated here-the activity that is declared by 
the court to be "quintessentially economic"-includes the "intrastate 
possession" of commodities, and "possession" is not included in the Court's 
1966 dictionary. 83 
By refusing to exclude noncommercial intrastate possession from the 
definition of what constitutes "economic" activity, the majority does more than 
refuse to excise de minimis instances from the regulated class. Rather, it refuses 
to excise non-commercial activities from a Congressionally defined class­
possession of a commodity-that is not, on its own terms, inherently economic. 
For the Raich majority, given that the "larger scheme" is economic, it is 
78 /d. at 2205 (citing Perez, 402 U.S. at 151). 
79 Id. at 2206 (quoting Wickard v. Filbum, 317 U.S. Ill, 125 (1942). 
80 Id at 2211 (quoting WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 720 
(\966» . As Justice Thomas notes, the majority provides no explanation for its reliance on 
this particular dictionary, and other dictionaries do not provide quite so expansive a 
definition of "economic." Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2236 n.7 (Thomas, 1., dissenting) ("Other 
dictionaries do not define the term 'economic' as broadly as the majority does .... The 
majority does not explain why it selects a remarkably expansive 40-year-old definition." 
(citation omitted». At one level, of course, the question answers itself. The majority cited 
this dictionary because it provided the definition that the majority wanted. 
81 1d.at2211. 
82 Id. 
83 This expansive approach to what constitutes "economic" activity is also in conflict 
with Lopez. Id. at 2225 (O'Connor, 1., dissenting) ("Lopez makes clear that possession is not 
itself a commercial activity."). 
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irrelevant that "purely intrastate," non-economic activities are covered.84 Not 
even the infamous case of Wickard v. Filburn,85 upon which Justice Stevens 
heavily relies, reached this far. Farmer Filburn was engaged in economic 
activity-planting wheat as part of a larger commercial enterprise-even if he 
was not engaged in "commerce" with the wheat in question. As deployed by 
Justice Stevens, however, the import of Wickard is that Congress may regulate 
all possession of an object potentially bought and sold in interstate commerce 
Filburn was engaged in the manufacture of goods for interstate commerce. 
The statutory scheme at issue controlled wheat production, in part, as a factor 
in the production of other goods (e.g. milk, beef) in order to control wheat 
prices. In this light, the Court's decision in Wickard could be seen as analogous 
to prior decisions in which the Court rejected a distinction between commerce 
and manufacture. The Court does not frame the case in this way, however, 
stressing instead that Wickard involved the regulation of a "purely intrastate 
activity" that was "not itself 'commercial,' in that it is not produced for sale," 
but could nonetheless be regulated if Congress believed a "failure to 
regulate . . . would undercut the regulation of the interstate market in that 
commodity."s6 
Morrison, as reinterpreted by Justice Stevens, is fully consonant with this 
result, because the statute in question in Raich- the CSA--"is a statute that 
directly regulates economic, commercial activity. ,,87 The invalidated V A W A 
provision (like the GFSZA) "fell outside Congress' commerce power in its 
entirety."ss Thus, so long as a statute largely regulates economic or commercial 
activity-or defines a given activity at a level of generality sufficiently broad to 
cover a substantial amount of economic activity-there is no limit to the 
amount of non-commercial, intrastate activity that may also succumb to federal 
power so long as Congress enacts a sufficiently expansive regulatory regime. 89 
The Commerce Clause analysis adopted by Justice Stevens provides no 
meaningful judicial check on Congressional power. A broad regulatory scheme 
that regulates economic matters in some regard will be constitutional in its 
entirety.9o If any privately produced item that can substitute for a commercially 
produced good is subject to federal control, then Congressional power knows 
few limits. A comprehensive federal regulatory scheme governing commercial 
day care services could justify regulating child care in the home.91 A 
comprehensive regulatory scheme governing pre-packaged frozen dinners 
could justify regulating domestic food preparation. A comprehensive regulatory 
scheme governing land sales could justify the complete displacement of local 
84 Jd. at 2209. 
85 317 U.S. 111 (J 942) (upholding the constitutionality of the Agricultural Adjustment 
Act of 1938). 
86 Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2206. 
87 Jd. at 221 I. 
88 Id. at 2209 (emphasis added). 
89 Of note, the majority opinion offers no response to this charge. 
90 Vermeule, supra note 51 , at 1332-33. 
91 Raich, 125 S. Ct. , at 2225 (O'Connor, 1. , dissenting). 
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zoning. And so on. Only the "political checks that ... generally curb Congress' 
power to enact a broad and comprehensive scheme" of regulation would stand 
. h 92m t e way. 
These expansive implications of the majority are made clear by the 
majority ' s near-absolute deference to what Congress found--4:lr, indeed, might 
have found had it looked. For the majority, the relevant question is not whether 
medical marijuana use in California actually does have a significant impact on 
commerce, but whether Congress could have believed so- even if it made no 
specific findings to that effect. 93 So long as an activity is "an essential part of a 
larger ... regulatory scheme,,94 then Congress can pretty much define the class 
of activities as broadly as it would like.95 Indeed, the broader the better, as this 
will all but ensure the statute's constitutionality. Under Raich the only question 
for the Court is whether Congess could have rationally concluded this, not 
whether it is actually the case. 6 IfCongress adopts legislation controlling non­
commercial intrastate activity, so long as there could be a rational basis for 
believing that the activity is substantially related to regulated commercial 
activity, it should be upheld- even if the Court disagrees.97 
While the majority opinion pays lip service to the idea of judicially 
enforceable limits on federal power, there is no evidence that the majority 
would ever second-guess Congress's conclusion that controlling non­
commercial conduct was necessary to regulate economic activity with which 
Congress was concerned. It may still be the case that narrow, largely symbolic 
statutes with no relationship to economic activity may exceed the Commerce 
Clause, but this is not a meaningful limit on federal power. Such a limit is 
dependent upon Congress's own restraint. So long as Congress thinks big- ­
"we want the world and we want it, now,,98-the judiciary will not limit the 
assertion of federal power. Like the Lizard King, Congress can do anything.99 
In this fashion, the judicial safeguards of federalism are once again replaced 
with the political safeguards of federalism. 
92 Id. at 2210 n.34. 
9] While substantial legislative findings accompanied passage of the CSA, none 
addressed the medical use of otherwise prohibited substances authorized and regulated under 
state law. This should be no surprise, as California and other states did not consider the 
regulated legalization of medical marijuana use until decades after adoption of the CSA. Id. 
at 2213 n.38 (noting California's law was enacted "34 years after the CSA was enacted"). 
94 United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S . 549,561 (1995). 
95 See Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2212 ("The congressional judgment that an exemption for 
such a significant segment of the total market would undermine the orderly enforcement of 
the entire regulatory scheme is entitled to a strong presumptiun of validity."). 
96 See id. at 2213 (noting Congress "could have rationally rejected" California's claim 
to have separated marijuana used for medical purposes from the broader marijuana market). 
97 Indeed, there is no indication in the majority opinion that the rational basis for this 
assumption needs to be articulated in the statute itself or legislatiVe history . 
98 THE DOORS, When the Music 's Over, on STRANGE:. DAYS (Elektra/Asylum Records 
1967). 
99 THE DOORS, Not to Touch the Earth, on WAITING FOR THE SUN (Elektra/Asylum 
Records 1968) ("I am the Lizard King. I can do anything."). See also DAVIS, supra note 1, at 
242. 
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A. Five to One lOO 
Concurring in the result Justice Scalia offered a "more nuanced," if no less 
expansive, opinion. 1ol In Scalia's view, the regulation of intrastate activities, 
such as Angel Raich's possession and consumption of marijuana for medical 
purposes, could not properly be justified as the regulation of "commerce." 
Intrastate possession, even of a commodity, is not "commerce." Therefore, 
Congress could not reach such activity under the Commerce Clause alone. 
Rather, Congress's power to reach such non-economic intrastate activities 
"derives from the Necessary and Proper Clause."I02 Rather than adopt an 
expansive definition of what constitutes an "economic" activity, Scalia instead 
relied upon the Necessary and Proper Clause to reach even those "intrastate 
activities that do not themselves substantially affect interstate commerce," 
where such regulation is "necessary to make a regulation of interstate 
commerce effective."lo3 Scalia wrote separately because "this power ' to 
make. . . regulation effective' commonly overlaps with the authority to 
regulate economic activities that substantially affect interstate commerce," yet 
the two powers are "distinct."lo4 
The commerce power, by necessity, encompasses the power to "facilitate 
interstate commerce by eliminatinltpotential obstructions, and to restrict it by 
eliminating potential stimulants." 0 While such actions may not constitute 
direct regulation of commerce itself, actions to lubricate or stultify the flow of 
goods and services in interstate commerce may be "necessary and proper" to 
I06
effectuate Congress ' s regulation of commerce. Because marijuana is a 
"fungible commodity," congressional power to control interstate drug 
trafficking provides sufficient basis to criminalize smoking home-grown 
marijuana pursuant to a doctor's prescription. The result in Wickard was 
grounded just as much on the "potential disruption" of Congress's efforts to 
control wheat prices as it was on any effect personal wheat consumption had on 
interstate commerce itself.107 Indeed, Scalia concurred with the majority's 
troubling conclusion that any non-economic intrastate activity is fair game, so 
long as such activities are regulated "in connection with a more comprehensive 
scheme of regulation."lo8 
100 THE DOORS, Five (0 One, on WAITING FOR ruE Sl,;N (ElektraJAsylum Records 1968). 
101 Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2215 (Scalia, J., concurring). Cf id. at 2230 (Thomas, J. , 
dissenting) (noting that the application of the Necessary and Proper Clause poses a "more 
difficult" question than application of the Commerce Clause itself). 
102 !d. at 2216 (Scalia, J., concurring). 

103 Id. at 2218 (Necessary and Proper Clause "empowers Congress to enact laws in 

effectuation of its enumerated powers that are not within its authority to enact in isolation"). 
104 !d.at2217. 
10' Id. at 2216. 
106 Id. at 2217 ("where Congress has the authority to enact a regulation of interstate 
commerce, 'it possesses every power needed to make that regulation effective.'" (quoting 
Unit.:d States v. Wrightwood Dairy, 315 U.S. 110, 118-19 (1942». 
107 Id. at 2217 n.2. 
108 Id. at 2218. 
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The problem with Scalia's formulation, however, is that the judgment as to 
whether the regulation of non-economic activity is necessary to further a 
regulation of commerce is left up to Congress, just as it is in Stevens's 
majority. In reviewing a federal statute "the relevant question is simply whether 
the means chosen are 'reasonabl1c adapted' to the attainment of a legitimate end 
under the commerce power." 09 Scalia makes clear that '''all measures 
necessary or appropriate to' the effective regulation of the interstate market,,,IIO 
as dt:termined by Congress, are allowed. Review of this question is to be quite 
deferential as well. 
Insofar as limits remain, limits that in Justice Scalia's view would justify 
the holdings of Lopez and Morrison, they are to be found in the rejection of 
federal authority based solely upon a "remote chain of inferences" connecting a 
given non-economic intrastate activity to some effect on interstate 
commerce. III Yet Scalia's opinion does not really insulate such activities from 
federal regulation. As suggested by the majority, the problem in Lopez was not 
that Congress sought to regulate intrastate gun possession, but that Congress 
failed to enact a more expansive regulatory statute. Indeed, Scalia as much as 
acknowledges that Lopez and Morrison "do not declare noneconomic activities 
to be categorically beyond the reach of the federal government.,,112 The 
problem in each of those cases was that neither statute regulated non-economic 
intrastate activity "in connection with a more comprehensive scheme of 
regulation." 11 3 Yet guns, no less than marijuana, are items in interstate 
commerce, so had Congress wanted to regulate gun possession in school zones, 
a more comprehensive regulatory scheme would have done the trick. I 14 
Scalia argues that his approach does retain limits on the Commerce 
Clause, but it is ultimately unconvincing. Scalia argues that "the power to enact 
laws enabling effective regulation of interstate commerce can only be exercised 
in conjunction with congressional regulation of an interstate market, and it 
extends onll to those measures necessary to make interstate regulation 
effective.,,11 Yet as he acknowledges, so long as Congress could reasonably 
conclude that the regulation of a given non-economic intrastate activity is 
necessary to maintain a broader regulatory scheme, it passes muster. Thus, as 
with the majority opinion, the real limit on Congress's ability to reach non­
economic intrastate conduct does not corne from judicial review, but from 
potential political opposition to the enactment of the broad regulatory measures 
109 ld. at 2217 (quoting United Stales v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 121 (1941». 
110 ld. at 2218 (quoting Shreveport Rate Cases, 234 U.S. 342,353 (1914» (emphasis 
added). 
I I I Id. at2217. 
112 Id. at2218. 
113 ld. 
114 See id. at 2219-20 n.3 (suggesting the Gun Free School Zones Act could have been 
upheld had it been part of a broader federal regulatory scheme). As Justice O'Connor 
observes, prior to Raich "such arguments have been made only in dissent." ld. at 2223 
(O 'Connor, J., dissenting) (citing United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 657 (2000) 
(Breyer, 1., dissenting». 
J 15 Id. at 2218 (Scalia, 1., concurring). 
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that would be necessary to reach otherwise non-regulatable activity. If this is 
"not a power that threatens to obliterate the line between 'what is truly national 
and what is truly local, ",116 this is solely because Congress is unlikely to 
regulate so aggressively as to preempt local control of most local activities. 
This is a revival of the "political safeguards offederalism" in all but name. 
At one level, Scalia's opinion is more doctrinally satisfying as it does not 
require the Court to morph the power to regulate "commerce among the states" 
into the power to regulate anything that might plausibly relate to such 
commerce. Nor does it rely upon an elastic interpretation of what constitutes 
economic activity. Yet as elaborated upon by Justice Scalia, this approach to 
the Commerce Clause results in an equally expansive interpretation of federal 
power, and poses just as mortal a threat to the viability of Morrison. By 
Scalia's admission, this is an expansive interpretation of Congress ' s regulatory 
authority. In some cases it may even be more expansive than the rationale 
.. 117 
adopted by t he maJonty. 
B. The Changeling I 18 
There was little doubt that the four most liberal justices would uphold an 
expansive interpretation of the Commerce Clause power. Justices Stevens, 
Souter, Ginsburg and Breyer made no secret of their distaste for the 
heightening of Commerce Clause scrutiny in Lopez and Morrison. Justice 
Kennedy, on the other hand, joined the majority in each of those cases, and 
stressed the importance of federalism and state autonomy in many other cases 
as well." 9 For this reason, Justice Kennedy's silence in Raich was quite 
conspicuous, as he appears to have changed his views on the judiciary's 
obligation to enforce meaningful limits on federal power. 
In Lopez, and elsewhere, Justice Kennedy stressed the importance of state 
autonomy. States, he suggested time and again, needed the freedom and 
flexibility to develop and implement different approaches to various policy 
concerns. While Congress may believe that banning guns in and around schools 
is the most efficient and effective way to reduce gun violence in schools, 
individual states could well deCide that other policies would be equally 
effective or better balance competing policy concerns. 120 While the U.S. 
Environmental Protection Agency might believe that local air quality is best 
116 fd. (quoting United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 561 (1995». 
117 ld. at 2216 (Scalia, 1., concurring) (noting that "the category of ' activities that 
substantially affect interstate commerce,' is incomplete because the authority to enact laws 
necessary and proper for the regulation of interstate commerce is not limited to laws 
governing intrastate activities that substantially affect interstate commerce' ) (citation 
omitted). 
118 THE DOORs, The Changeling, on L.A. WOMAr\ (ElektraJAsylum Records 1971). 
119 See, e.g., Alaska Dep't of Envtl. Cons. v. Envtl. Prot. Agy., 540 U.S. 461, 502 
(2004) (Kennedy, J., dissenting); Nev. Dep't of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721 , 744 
(2003) (Kennedy, J., dissenting); Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999). But see U.S. Tenn 
Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779 (1995). 
120 United States v. Lopez, 514 C.S. 549, 583 (1995) (Kennedy. J. , concurring). 
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protected through the adoption of particular technologies when facilities are 
built or modified, individual states might prefer alternative approaches that 
place a greater priority on local economic conditions. 121 Yet if a state believes 
that the controlled medical use of marijuana is in the best interest of its citizens, 
it is not allowed the flexibility to experiment with such a policy if the federal 
government believes that any and all possession and consumption of marijuana 
is unacceptable. 
Justice Kennedy may have been convinced by the federal government's 
argument that allowing medical marijuana in one or more states would threaten 
the federal government's control of interstate drug markets and compromise the 
general prohibition on the manufacture and distribution of illegal drugs. Yet 
states opposed to the legalization of medical marijuana did not share thIs view. 
Three states filed an amicus brief to in support of the respondents despite their 
opposition to California's policy.!22 Not a single state filed a brief defending 
the federal government's position.123 The federal government argued that 
excluding any marijuana possession from the CSA, for any purpose, threatened 
the viability of national prohibition. Yet Alabama, where drug possession is 
prosecuted quite vigorously,124 sought to "support their neighbor's prerogative 
in our federalist system to serve as 'laboratories for experimentation. ",125 
California's policy may have been "profoundly misguided," yet it posed a 
lesser threat to Alabama's sovereignty than a federal commerce power without 
effective judicial restraints. Despite Justice Kennedy's prior solicitude for 
allowing states to act as laboratories of democracy, he did not respond to such 
concerns. 126 
One possible explanation for Justice Kennedy's position is that states 
should be permitted to engage in policy experiments only in those contexts 
where there is little risk. of significant interjurisdictional competition. In Lopez, 
Justice Kennedy noted that leaving states free to set their own policies 
unleashes a competitive dynamic through which states experiment and compete 
to provide the mix of services and amenities desired by present and prospective 
residents. 127 This dynamic may not operate in an equivalent fashion across all 
policy areas, however. States that adopt unduly burdensome taxes or 
regulations risk discouraging business investment or expansion, and even 
121 See Alaska, 540 U.S. at 502 (Kennedy, 1., dissenting). 
122 Brief of the States of Alabama, Louisiana, and Mississippi as Amici Curiae 
Supporting Respondents, Gonzales v. Raich, 2004 WL 2336486 (hereinafter Alabama Brief). 
Louisiana, while a party to the brief, does allow the medicinal use of marijuana in very 
limited circumstances. See id. at n.5. 
123 This is potentially significant because, in other federalism cases, many states filed 
briefs supporting the constitutionality of a broad Commerce Clause power. 
124 See Ethan Nadelmann, An End to Marijuana Prohibition, NATl. REv. (July 12, 
2004), at 28 ("Alabama currently locks up people convicted three times of marijuana 
possession for 15 years to life."). 
125 Alabama Brief, supra note 122, at 2-3. 
126 See Gonzales v. Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195,2221 (2005) (Connor, J., dissenting) ("This 
case exemplifies the role of States as laboratories. "). 
127 United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 581 -583 (1995) (Kennedy, 1., concurring). 
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driving taxpayers to more hospitable jurisdictions. Criminal laws, like those 
aimed at suppressing school violence or gender-motivated crimes, "cut[] the 
opposite way.,,128 Whereas states may benefit from reducing taxes or easing 
regulations, they benefit from increasing, not decreasing, the stringency of 
criminal laws. 129 Allowing states to experiment with different approaches to 
controlling drug abuse, it seems, risks some states adopting policies that are 
insufficiently stringent, as California and several other states elected to 
decriminalize medical marijuana possession. This sort of interjurisdictional 
competition--the sort that results in true policy diversity-is foreclosed by 
Raich. Yet to only allow states to experiment where the policy outcome is 
certain is to forego the benefits of state experimentation in the first place. 130 
It is also possible that Justice Kennedy is convinced that any federal effort 
to control the national market in a commodity or service is constitutional, 
insofar as the emergence of a "single national market" is what led to the 
131
expansion of the federal commerce power in the first place. Other 
commentators have been less charitable in their initial assessments, suggesting 
that Justice Kennedy may have views about drug use that eclipse his concerns 
about the traditional federal state balance.132 Whatever the reason for his vote, 
Justice Kennedy offered no explanation as to how the Raich holding comported 
with federalism principles he endorsed in prior opinions. In Raich, we saw a 
once-reliable vote for a judicially enforced federalism change into a defender of 
federal power. 
IV. I CAN'T SEE YOUR FACE133 
One additional wrinkle in Raich was the respondent's effort to mount an 
as-applied Commerce Clause challenge. Raich did not maintain that the CSA 
as a whole, or even any of its provisions, was unconstitutional and should be 
struck down.134 Rather, she maintained that the CSA was only unconstitutional 
as-applied to the specific conduct at issue. This was potentially significant 
because, up until this point, the only successful Commerce Clause challenges 
128 Epstein, supra note 37, at 180. 
129 GREVE, supra note 2l, at 32. 
110 Id. at 82 ("a Court that celebrates state government only when and where the states 
will surely regulate ... will soon forget that federalism's point is to discipline state 
governments, not to empower them." ). 
131 Lopez, 514 U.S. at 568, 574 (Kennedy, J., concurring) ("Congress can regulate in 
the commercial sphere on the assumption that we have a single market and a unified purpose 
to build a stable national economy."). 
132 See Lyle Denniston, Commentary: Justice Kennedy and the "War on Drugs ", 
SCOTUSBLOG, June 6, 2005 ("Kennedy, it has been clear for some time, has little tolerance, 
judicial or otherwise, for those who are users of drugs, or who resist drug control 
measures.") available at http://www.scotusblog.com!movabletype/archives/2005/06/ 
commentaryjust.htm!. 
133 THE DOORS, I Can't See Your Face, on STRANGE DAYS (Elektra/Asylum Records 
1967). 
134 Gonzales v. Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195,2230 (2005) (Connor, J., dissenting). 
771 2005] IS MORRISON DEAD? 
were facial challenges. While some litigants in prior cases had sought to make 
as-applied challenges to federal statutes, such claims were rejected by the 
Supreme Court every time they were brought. 135 If there was such a thing as an 
as-applied Commerce Clause challenge, there was little indication in the U.S. 
Reports what it might look like, and how it should be framed. 
Facial challenges are rather straightforward. When a litigant challenges the 
constitutionality of a statute "on its face," she argues that the statute is invalid 
irrespective of its application. For such a challenge to be successful, the litigant 
must demonstrate that "no set of circumstances exists under which the Act 
would be valid .,,136 As the Supreme Court explained in United States v. 
Salerno , this makes a facial challenge "the most difficult challenge to mount 
successfully" against a federal statute. 137 
As a reneral rule, courts disfavor facial constitutional challenges to federal 
statutes. 13 Rather, the typical constitutional challenge alleges that a given 
statute is unconstitutional as-applied to a particular litigant or particular 
situation. 139 A successful as-applied challenge does not strike down the statute 
in question. It merely bars the government from applying that statute to the 
situation at hand. After a successful as-applied challenge, the government 
remains free to apply the statute in other contexts. The fact that the statute 
might be unconstitutional as-applied to certain circumstances has no impact on 
the law's overall validity.14o Outside of the First Amendment context, a law 
will not be struck down on "overbreadth" grounds because it "might operate 
unconstitutionally under some conceivable set of circumstances.,,141 
While the Court did not pause to declare the type of challenge at issue in 
either Lopez or Morrison, it is fairly clear that the Court upheld facial 
135 Nathaniel S. Stewart, Note, Turning the Commerce Clause "On Its Face ": Why 
Federal Commerce Clause Statutes Demand Facial Challenges, 55 CASE WES. L. REv. 161 
(2004). As Stewart details: 
[T]he Supreme Court has invariably abstained from invalidating Commerce Clause 
starutes on an as-applied basis. That is, the Court has engaged in the facial analysis of 
determining whether the class of activity at issue is a constitutionally regulable class, 
and then whether the petitioner was a member of that class. 
Jd. at 196. 
136 United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987). 
137 /d. 
138 A court "should not extend its invalidation of a statute further than necessary to 
dispose of the case before it." Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, Inc. 472 U.S. 491, 502 (1985) . 
See also United States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17, 20-22 (1960) (as-applied challenges are 
preferred to facial challenges). 
139 See Richard H. Fallon, Jr. , As-Applied and Facial Challenges and Third-Party 
Standing, 113 HARv. L. REv. 1321 , 1321 (2000) ("the normal if not exclusive mode of 
constitutional adjudication involves an as-applied challenge"). Indeed, Professor Fallon goes 
further, positing that "[a]l! challenges to statutes arise when a litigant claims that a statute 
cannot be enforced against her." Jd. 
140 See Salerno, 481 U.S. at 745 ("The fact that the Bail Reform Act might operate 
unconstitutionally under conceivable set of circumstances is insufficient to render it wholly 
invalid ..."). 
141 Jd. 
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challenges to the respective statutes in each case. 142 In neither case did the 
Court consider whether the specific conduct at issue-Alfonso Lopez's 
possession of a gun in school or two Virginia Tech football players' alleged 
brutal rape of another student- was substantially related to interstate 
commerce. Rather, the Court considered the laws themselves, striking them 
down because the relevant provisions lacked the necessary attachment to 
interstate commerce. In doing so, the Court necessarily held that in each case 
"no set of circumstances exists under which the Act would be vaJid.,,143 
Had the Court only considered an as-applied challenge in either case, the 
result might have been different, particularly in Lopez. Alfonso Lopez had 
brought the r;n to school as a courier in order to complete a commercial 
transaction. 14 His possession in this particular case was commercial. 145 On this 
basis, the Court could have readily aggregated Lopez's gun possession in a 
school zone with all other instances of commercial gun possession in school 
zones- that is, all the other instances in which someone brought a gun into a 
school zone for the purpose of furthering a commercial transaction- and 
upheld the law as-applied to Lopez. After a1l, the de minimis nature of the 
activity is irrelevant if it may be aggregated with other like instances. As an as­
appJied challenge, Lopez would be virtually indistinguishable from cases like 
Perez v. United States, in which the Court upheld the federal regulation of a 
small-time local loan shark. 146 
The Court did not uphold the GFSZA as-applied to Lopez, however. 
Rather, it struck down the statute because the regulated activity-gun 
possession in a school zone-was not economic. As the Court noted, the 
GFSZA "by its terms has nothing to do with 'commerce' or any sort of 
economic enterprise, however broadly one might define those terms"; 147 this 
was true regardless of whether Lopez possessed the gun for commercial 
purposes. It had no more than an attenuated connection to interstate commerce 
and could not be aggregated to sustain the law. Indeed, the fact that Lopez was 
engaged in a commercial transaction was not even mentioned in any of the 
justices' opinions.148 As emphasized in Morrison, the regulated conduct-gun 
142 See Sabri v. United States, 541 U.S. 600, 610 (2004) (Kennedy, J., concurring in 
part) (noting that in Lopez and Morrison, the Court resolved "the basic question whether 
Congress, in enacting the statutes challenged there, had exceeded its legislative power under 
the Constitution") (emphasis added); Rancho Viejo, L.L.C. v. Norton, 334 F.3d 1158, 1160 
(D.C. Cir. 2003) (Roberts, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc) ("The Court in 
those cases upheld facial Commerce Clause challenges to legislation prohibiting the 
possession of firearms in school zones and violence against women."). 
143 United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S 739, 745 (1987). 

144 United States v. Lopez, 2 F.3d 1342, 1345 (5th Cir. 1993). 

145 For instance, had the federal government banned gun possession for the purpose of 

engaging in black market firearms transactions, gun sales to minors, or some other 
commercially related activity. 
146 402 U.S. 146, 146-47 (1971). 
147 United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561 (emphasis added). 
148 Rancho Viejo, L.L.c. v. Norton, 323 F.3d 1062, 1072 (D.C. Cir. 2003), reh 'g en 
banc denied, 334 F.3d 1158 (2003) (noting "the Supreme Court attached no significance to" 
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possession in a school zone- was nOl commercial in character. 149 This was true 
regardless of the commercial nature of Alfonso Lopez's specific conduct. 
The problem in each case was that the class of activities that Congress 
sought to regulate was beyond the scope of Congress's Commerce Clause 
authority, even though it was conceivable that either statute could be applied to 
specific conduct that was commercial in character. Had the statutes been 
written differently- perhaps including jurisdictional elements that would have 
confined each statute's reach to those activities sufficiently connected to 
commcrce to lay within the scope of federal powerl50-the results would 
almost certainly have been different. Rather than confront the constitutionality 
of each statute as a whole, the Court would have considered whether, given the 
facts of each specific case, a sufficient commercial connection was 
demonstrated to satisfy the requirements of the law. In Jones v. United States, 
for example, a unanimous court interpreted a federal statute prohibiting arson 
of any "property used in interstate or foreign commerce or in any activity 
affecting interstate or foreign commerce,,151 to cover "onlr property currently 
used in commerce or in an activity affecting commerce." 5 By its terms, the 
statute only reached those activities within Congress's Commerce Clause 
authority, so there would be no means to challenge the law as-applied. So long 
as CO:1gress can prohibit arsons that are sufficiently connected to commerce, 
there is no constitutional problem with applying the statute to any given 
conduct that is itself sufficiently connected to commerce. 
As noted above, the Supreme Court never ruled favorably on an as-applied 
Commerce Clause challenge. More important for understanding the obstacles 
confronting tht respondents in Raich, the analysis consistently adopted by the 
Court in Commerce Clause cases would seem to preclude the possibility of an 
as-applied challenge. As the Court noted in Maryland v. Wirtz, "[t]he only 
question for the courts is then whether the class is 'within the reach of the 
federal power. ",153 And in every Commerce Clause case in the last six decades, 
the class has been defined by the terms of the statute adopted by Congress. 154 
Thus, if a given litigant's conduct is within the statutorily defined class-and 
regulation of the class as a whole is constitutional (or part of a broader, 
constitutional regulatory scheme )-the challenge will necessarily fail. 
This is as true in the "New Federalism" cases as it was in the New Deal. 
For the Court to do what it did in Lopez and Morrison, it had to define the class 
Lopez's participation in a commercial transaction). 
149 United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 611 (2000). 
150 For instance, the law could have been rewritten to require that the possession be 
with the intent to engage in a commercial transaction. 
151 18 U.S.C. § 844(i) (2000). 
152 529 U.S . 848, 859 (2000). 
153 Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183,192 (1968) (quoting United States v. Darby, 312 
U.S. 100,120- 21 (1941) (emphasis added). 
154 From this perspective, one can argue that the proper Commerce Clause challenge to 
a federal statute is, in fact. a facial challenge. This case is made at length in Stewart, supra 
note 135 . 
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based upon the conduct identified by Congress as the subject of the regulation. 
If a statute prohibits "possession of a firearm in a school zone" or "filling a 
jurisdictional wetland without a permit," then that is how the class of activities 
is defined for the purposes of a Commerce Clause challenge. 155 If the statute 
also lacks a jurisdictional element, the question is not whether the specific 
conduct engaged in by a litigant affects commerce, either in isolation or in 
combination with all other like conduct. Rather, it is whether the conduct 
identified by Congress substantially affects commerce. If so, the statute is 
constitutional, and the only question is whether the litigant's conduct fall s 
within the statute. 156 
Under existing precedents, for an as-applied challenge to be viable there 
needs to be an alternative means of defining the relevant class. Prior to Raich, 
none of the Court's opinions suggested how this could be done. The Court has 
noted that "depending on the level of generality, any activity can be looked 
upon as commercial.,,1 57 Because de minimis instances of a regulable class are 
not excluded from Congress's reach, the Court was required to adopt a 
qualitative approach to determining what activities substantially affect 
commerce. 
l58 Yet it has still focused on the class as defined by Congress so as 
to avoid a potentially standard less and indeterminate inquiry into how a given 
regulated activity should be classified and characterized. 
The reason why as-applied challenges are nonetheless appealing is because 
requiring facial challenges has the potential to be very strong medicine.159 
Where federal statutes lack jurisdictional elements, or other provisions that 
would enable courts to excise a given litigant's conduct from the statute's 
reach, the only way a court can rule favorably on a Commerce Clause challenge 
is to strike the statute down. In the case of a broad regulatory statute, such as 
the Controlled Substances Act, the lack of as-applied challenges presents courts 
with a dilemma: Invalidate the statute or allow Congress to re~ulate classes of 
activities that lack a substantial relation to interstate commerce. 60 
155 See, e.g., GDF Realty Invs. v. Norton, 326 F.3d 622, 633 (5th Cir. 2003) (noting 
"the scope of the inquiry is primarily whether the expressly regulated activity substantially 
affects interstate commerce"). 
156 As a practical matter, these issues are likely to be addressed in the opposite order so 
as to avoid the premature consideration of constitutional questions. That is, the Court will 
first determine whether the conduct in question falls within the scope of the statute. Only 
after answering this question affirmatively will a court then proceed to considering the 
statute ' s constitutionality. 
157 United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 565 (1995). 
158 Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183, 193 (1968) (Courts lack the power "to excise, as 
trivial , individual instances falling within a rationally defined class of activities."). 
159 See Nat'l Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 580 (1998) ("Facial 
invalidation ' is , manifestly, strong medicine' that ' has been employed by the Court sparingly 
and only as a last resort. " , (citation omitted». 
160 Under the general assumption that statutory provisions will be severable, the court 
would not have to strike down the statute in its entirety, but it would have to invalidate a 
given statutory provision. 
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A good example is the Endangered Species Act (ESA).161 Under section 9 
of the ESA, it is unlawful to "take" a species listed as "endangered" under the 
act. 162 The ESA defines "take" to include just about any activity that could kill, 
injure, or harm a listed species, including the modification of habitat on private 
land. 163 While the law clearly covers many commercial activities, such as 
paving over habitat to build a parking lot or strip mall, as well as economically 
motivated behavior, such as hunting endangered animals to sell their feathers or 
fur, by its terms the ESA is not confined to conduct that is substantially related 
to commerce. While it may be the case that the vast majority of activity 
regulated under the ESA would still be regulated were the statute to contain a 
jurisdictional element limiting its application to commercially related activities, 
such a provision is lacking. For this reason, it is not immediately clear why the 
taking of a species on private land is all that different from carrying a gun to 
school. Each activity may be related to commerce in any given instance, but a 
statute prohibiting either does not define a commercially related class. That is 
to say, whether a given individual's conduct is covered by the statute has 
nothing to do with whether her conduct substantially affects commerce. All that 
matters is the "take" of a listed species. Shooting an endangered owl out of 
spite is just as illegal as bulldozing Delhi Sands Flower-loving fly habitat for 
commercial development. A teenager's spiteful use of a slingshot can be just as 
criminal as a developer's profit-seeking use of land movers. Without an as­
applied challenge, the federal government's authority to regulate both activities 
will rise or fall together. 
Faced with this dilemma, appellate courts have struggled to come up with 
coherent rationales for sustaining the ESA against Commerce Clause 
challenges. '64 In the cases to date, three divided appellate courts have upheld 
the ESA as against Commerce Clause challenge. 165 Appellate judges are 
understandably reluctant to invalidate a far-reaching environmental statute 
intended to protect thousands of different species from extinction.166 After 
Morrison they are also not to uphold federal statutes on a basis that effectively 
161 16 U.S.C'. §§ 1531 - 44 (2000). 
162 16 U.S.c. § 1538(a)(I) (2000). 
163 16 U.S.c. § 1532(19) (2000) (defining to "take" as "to harass, harm, pursue, hunt, 
shoot, wound, kill, trap, capture, or collect, or attempt to engage in any such conduct"). See 
also Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys. , 515 U.S. 687, 690 (1995) (upholding 
definition of "take" to include "significant habitat modification or degradation" that 
"actually kills or injures wildlife"). 
164 This issue is addressed in greater depth in Jonathan H. Adler, Judicial Federalism 
and the Future ofFederal Environmental Regulation, 90 IOWA L. REv. 377,406-17 (2005). 
165 See Rancho Viejo, L.L.C. v. Norton, 323 F.3d 1062, 1064 (D.C. Cir. 2003), reh 'g en 
banc denied, 334 F.3d 1158 (2003); GDF Realty Invs. v. Norton, 326 F.3d 622, 624 (5th Cir. 
2003); Gibbs v. Babbitt, 214 FJd 483, 487 (4th Cir. 2000); Nat'l Ass'n of Home Builders v. 
Babbitt, 130 F.3d 1041, 1043 (D.C. Cir. 1997). 
166 Appellate judges are reluctant to strike down such a well-intentioned statute even if 
it does not clearly protect endangered species. See Adler, supra note 164, at 459-60 
(summarizing arguments that the Endangered Species Act is not effective at conserving 
species). 
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creates an unlimited federal regulatory power. Yet lacking the means to rule on 
an as-applied challenge, they must choose one or the other. 
Like prior courts, the Raich majority dealt with this issue by treating the 
as-applied challenge as if it were a facial challenge. 167 The Court acknowledged 
that the challenge was as-applied, but the Court did not conduct an as-applied 
analysis. Although the Court uses the phrase "as applied" several times 
throughout the decision, there is really no as-applied analysis. Insofar as the 
Court holds that minor, intrastate, non-economic activities may be regulated as 
part of a broader regulatory scheme, there is no set of facts to which an 
otherwise valid law would be unconstitutional "as-applied." 
Given that the CSA itself is a constitutional regulation of economic 
activity, the Court saw no basis upon which it could carve out the conduct at 
issue from the overall regulatory scheme. Indeed, the Court fully deferred to 
Congress's judgment that the class of activities regulated by the CSA was a 
single, undifferentiated class for the purposes of Commerce Clause 
challenges.168 Given Congress ' s apparent, albeit now wholly articulated, 
judgment, the Court dismissed efforts by the respondents and the dissenters to 
differentiate the noncommercial intrastate possession of marijuana for medical 
purposes pursuant to state law from commercially related possession. 
This treatment of an as-applied challenge was not an innovation in Raich. 
To the contrary, the Court's refusal "to excise individual components of that 
larger scheme" has been the norm-a norm to which there have been no 
exceptions. 169 After Raich, this pattern will continue. Because an "as-applied" 
challenge is only a challenge to a federal statute as-applied to a given 
class-and because the Court holds that Congress may regulate any class of 
activities that are plausibly connected to commerce so long as the regulation is 
part of a broader regulatory scheme-there is no potential for a successful as­
applied challenge under Raich. When Morrison died, the prospect for as­
applied Commerce Clause challenges expired as well. 
V. WHEN THE MUSIC'S OVERI7o 
When Jim Morrison's body was discovered lying in a bathtub in a Paris 
flat, some doubted he was really dead. l7l There were rumors he had died 
167 There are cases in which the Court appeared to consider as-applied challenges to 
federal statutes. See, e. g., Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964); Heart of Atlanta 
Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964). A careful reading of the Court's analyses in 
these cases, however, reveals that the Court actually engaged in facial review of the statutes 
at issue. See Stewart, supra note 135, at 191-92. 
168 Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2206 ("We have never required Congress to legislate wilh 
scientific exactitude. When Congress decides that the ' '' total incidence '" of a practice poses 
a threat to a national market, it may regulate the entire class."). 
169 ld. at 2209 ("As we have done many times before, we refuse to excise individual 
components of a larger regulatory scheme."). 
170 THE DOORS, When the Music's Over, on STRANGE DAYS (Elektra/Asylum Records 
1967). 
I - I 
, DAVIS. supra note I, at 466. 
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before,172 and to this day some maintain his death was staged. 173 But there is 
little doubt his life ended that sad day in France, ending a brief yet brilliant 
musical career. 174 
The death of United States v. Morrison is equally hard to deny. Insofar as 
Morrison validated and fortified the holding of United States v. Lopez, its work 
has been undone. While it is possible to distinguish Raich, and argue the CSA 
is materially different from many other federal regulatory statutes, courts are 
unlikely to take this step any time soon. 175 Without the possibility of as-applied 
Commerce Clause challenges, such opportunities are unlikely to arise. Federal 
appellate courts were already reluctant to curtail federal power on Commerce 
Clause grounds. They will be even more timid after the Court's rejection of 
early experiments at isolating distinct non-commercial activity from broader 
regulatory schemes. 
In another sense, Morrison will live on. Like Lopez, it will be cited in 
subsequent cases for the generic proposition that federal power is limited. 
Morrison's formulation of the relevant considerations in evaluating Commerce 
Clause challenges will be repeated, but they will not retain any meaningful 
doctrinal force. Congress may not be able to enact stand-alone, symbolic 
legislation, but it will face no meaningful judicial obstacles to the assertion of 
far-reaching regulatory authority. Insofar as the judicial safeguards of limited 
and enumerated powers survive, they are a pale echo of what they might have 
been. 
Jim Morrison's music lives on without him. Vigorous sales of 
posthumously released records and demos, videos of live performances, and 
other memorabilia continue to this day.176 There was even a VH -1 special and a 
Doors reunion tour performing music Morrison himself never sang before a 
live aUdience. 177 Yet even the most talented replacement does not have the 
vitality of the real thing. It is a pale echo and, for some, a painful memory of 
what might have been. 
172 Jd. at 245 (United Press International erroneously reported Morrison's death in 
March 1968). 
173 Jd. at 467 (noting one Morrison biography suggests Morrison "might have faked his 
own death"). 
174 Jim Morrison died only five years after The Doors signed their recording deal with 
Elektra Records. By comparison, Raich was handed down only five years after Morrison . 
175 Ray Manzarek and Robby Krieger did not tour as The Doors of the 21 st Century 
until over thirty years after Morrison's death. 
176 See, e.g., THE DOORS, IN CONCERT (ElektralAsylum Records 1991); THE DOORS, 
THE BEST OF THE DOORS (ElektralAsylum Records 1985); JIM MORRISON, Al\ AMERICA)\; 
PMYER (Elektral Asy lum Records 1978). See also http://www.thedoors.com. 
177 Jim Morrison died before The Doors toured in support of the L.A. Woman album. 
See also "Riders on the Storm," at http: //www.thedoors.comlbandl?fa=21stc. 
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This is the end, beautiful friend 

This is the end, my only friend 

The end ofour elaborate plans 

The end ofeverythin~ that stands 

The end.' 8 

178 THE DOORS, The End, on THE DOORS (ElektraJAsylum 1967). 
